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COMMENT
A QUALIFIED DEFENSE:
IN SUPPORT OF THE DOCTRINE
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN
EXCESSIVE FORCE CASES,
WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS

FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT
MICHAEL M. ROSEN"

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: a police officer serving an
arrest warrant surprises the suspect, who promptly leaps into
his car, guns the engine, and drives off. The officer, on foot and
with gun drawn, opens fire on the vehicle in an effort to disable
it and apprehend the suspect. A bullet goes astray and gravely
injures the suspect. How does - and should - our constitutional tort system address this situation? Does it matter if the
" Michael M. Rosen is an attorney in San Diego at Fish & Richardson PC, an
intellectual property law fIrm. In 2003-2004 he served as a law clerk to The Honorable
Marilyn L. Huff, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California. He graduated from Harvard Law School in 2003, and he gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Professor William Stuntz, under whose tutelage he originally wrote this article while at Harvard. Michael also offers profound thanks to Detective Jesse H. Grant of the Oakland Police Department for his time and enthusiasm
in explaining the ins-and-outs of police work in a challenging city. Michael also thanks
his family for their continued love and support. He dedicates this article to his wife,
Debra, for her inexhaustible patience and constant inspiration.
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event occurred in a high-crime area? If the suspect was aiming
his car at the police officer? If it was broad daylight on a street
filled with children at play? If the officer's police department
had issued guidelines for using deadly force in these instances?
If the department or the law enforcement union paid its officers' legal fees?
All of these questions come into play when the complex
doctrine of qualified immunity encounters the rough-andtumble world of excessive force tort lawsuits. 1 Our system
strikes a balance between supporting the efforts of law enforcement agents and redressing the wrongs that they visit on
ordinary citizens, through the vehicle of qualified immunity!
In an atmosphere in which police officers face a growing movement of "depolicing,"3 qualified immunity remains a bulwark
against the costs and over-deterrence that tort trials impose!
Under the standard for qualified immunity, which courts generally apply at the summary judgment" stage of the litigation, a
defendant who can show either that no clearly established law
barred his or her conduct or that the behavior itself implicated
no constitutional concerns will avoid trial and the discovery
process. 6
Critics argue with some force, however, that qualified immunity in the Fourth Amendment excessive force context is an
incoherent jumble of legal standards and policy premises that
bear no relationship to reality.' This article addresses several
criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine and defends the
doctrine, through an examination of the key cases and commentary on them, as a reasonably coherent and effective
mechanism for sorting out worthy from unworthy litigation.s
"Qualified immunity" can briefly be defined as a protection from trial available
to certain government employees acting in their official capacity if the conduct in question did not violate a constitutional right clearly established at the time of the incident.
2 See infra Part I-B.
3 "Depolicing" refers to a decline in support of the efforts of law enforcement
from municipal authorities, usually as a reflection of worsening popular perception of a
local police department.
4 See infra Parts I-A and I-B.
• A summary judgment hearing is held prior to trial when a party believes that
no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
6 See infra Part I-B.
, See infra Part II.
1

B

[d.
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This article also identifies some important shortcomings in the
doctrine and outlines modifications that would improve its
functioning, improvements that would quiet the chorus of criticism that several commentators have directed at the doctrine. 9
Part I provides background information concerning the
doctrine of qualified immunity and its application to excessive
force cases. Part I also considers the policy debates that the
doctrine has bred, concluding that on balance qualified immunity serves two important functions that give the doctrine purpose. Part II defends the doctrine in excessive force cases
against three criticisms: that conduct cannot be "reasonably
unreasonable,""o that summary judgment is ill-matched to the
factual and legal questions posed by qualified immunity arguments,l1 and that the term "clearly established" is anything
but. 12 Part II also responds to the criticisms hurled at the
qualified immunity doctrine, demonstrating that conduct can
be "reasonably unreasonable," arguing that through limited
discovery qualified immunity would become better suited for
summary judgment, and suggesting standards for defining
"clearly established law." Part III concludes the article and
recapitulates its major points.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Simply put, if an officer's conduct, viewed in the light most
favorable to an excessive force plaintiff, did not violate a clearly
established constitutional right at the time of the incident, the
defendant can avoid standing trial for the alleged tort. The
contemporary standardl3 for qualified immunity is most clearly
articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, I. Anderson v. Creighton, 15

• Id.
See infra Part II-A.
11 See infra Part II-B.
12 See infra Part II-C.
13 See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 Vand.
L. Rev. 583 (1998) and Alan Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary
Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1997)
for excellent historical descriptions of the development of the doctrine.
14 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
15 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
10
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and Saucier v. Katz. In Harlow, the Supreme Court first articulated the modern view of qualified immunity.17 There, the
plaintiff sued the President of the United States and several of
his senior advisors for conspiring unlawfully to discharge him
from the Air Force. IB Defendant Harlow argued that he had
acted in good faith and had had no reason to believe a conspiracy existed. 19 Asserting that the social costs of frivolous litigation include "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office," Justice Powell found
for the majority that the defendants could assert qualified, but
not absolute, immunity:o The Court held that this immunity
shields government agents from liability for civil damages so
long as their conduct does not violate "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. 1I21
In Anderson, the Court refined Harlow's statement of the
doctrine by defming "clearly established law" and by holding
that the Fourth Amendment itself represented far too broad a
standard to constitute clearly established law." The court
found that if something as general as a constitutional amendment qualified as clearly established law, then officers in the
field would lack guidance entirely."3 Instead of the "extremely
abstract rights" that Creighton claimed Anderson violated, in
order to escape a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a
plaintiff would need to show that "the contours of the right
[are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right....• The phrase
16

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.
16 Id. at 802-3.
19 Id. at 804.
'" Id. at 814-15.
21 Id. at 818.
In a footnote, the Harlow court made an important observation,
distinguishing in theory but equating in practice constitutional violations brought
against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and "suits brought directly under the
Constitution against federal officials." Id. at 818 n.30. These latter suits, known as
Bivens actions after a prototypical case, will remain indistinguishable from § 1983
litigation for the purposes of this article.
22 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
23 Id. As Justice Scalia argued for the majority, "if the test of 'clearly established
law' were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the
'objective legal reasonableness' that is the touchstone of Harlow." Id.
.. Id. at 640.
16

17
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"clear contours" has become the touchstone for many qualified
immunity scholars who have searched for a definition of
"clearly established" law:5
In Saucier, the Court held that qualified immunity applied
to excessive force cases. A military policeman shoved Katz the plaintiff - into a van in the wake of Katz's protest of Vice
President AI Gore's speech at a decommissioned army base in
San Francisco:6 Elliot Katz unfurled a banner as Gore began
speaking, an action that Donald Saucier and other agents
viewed as threatening to the Vice President.27 After the district
court denied Saucier summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the defendant's actions, as alleged by the
plaintiff, were "objectively unreasonable. rna More importantly,
the court of appeals asserted, "the inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the use of excessive
force is the same as the inquiry on the merits of the excessive
force claim. "29
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Ninth Circuit had misstated the standard for qualified immunity.30 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, began by describing the
nature of qualified immunity as "'an immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity,
it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial.'"31 The Court then observed that the Ninth Circuit had
reversed the proper order of the immunity calculus; instead, a
court must first examine whether a constitutional right would
have been violated based on the plaintiffs allegations.32 If so,
the court must then explore whether the plaintiffs alleged
right was clearly established at the time of the incident. 33 Referring to the "clear contours" language in Anderson, Justice
Kennedy asserted that the inquiry hinges on "whether it would
.. See infra Part II-C; see also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's
Manual, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 187,202 (1993).
26 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197-99.
27 Id. at 198.
28 Katz v. U.S., 194 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2000).
28 Id. at 968. (quoting, among others, Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64
F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995». This issue will be taken up in Part II-A.
30 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
31Id. at 200-1 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in
original)) .
32 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20l.
33 Id.
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be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted."34 Such unlawfulness can be deduced not only from directly relevant statutes but also from
analogous case law.35 In the instance at hand, the plaintiff,
Katz, failed to demonstrate that clearly established law prohibited the defendant's conduct. 36
The Court went further in an effort to preempt the criticisms of the concurrence that its formulation enabled "reasonably unreasonable conduct." Justice Kennedy explained the
"further dimension" that qualified immunity adds to the standard reasonableness calculus:
The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that
reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints
on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant
facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the
officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable,
however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense. 37

In other words, for the officer to lose the benefit of qualified
immunity, not only must the conduct be unreasonable but the
officer's application of the most relevant legal standard to the
situation at hand must also lack a reasonable basis.
Writing in concurrence, Justice Ginsburg, along with Justices Stevens and Breyer, sought to consolidate, as the Ninth
Circuit did, the qualified immunity inquiry into the simple
question of "whether officer Saucier, in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him, could have reasonably believed
he acted lawfully.»38 Under this approach, the two-part test recommended by Anderson would not constitute an appropriate
model for excessive force cases, an area of the law that is undergoing continuous change. 39 But the majority's test is the
.. [d. at 202.
M [d. See infra Part II-C.
36 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209.
37 [d. at 205.
38 [d. at 211.
39 [d. at 214.
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regnant standard for qualified immunity, even in excessive
force cases. An examination of how well this doctrine relates to
the delicate real-world interactions between police officers and
the civilians they serve occupies the next section.
B.

POLICY ANALYSIS

Public policy seeks to balance the need to protect law enforcement officers from frivolous lawsuits against the desire to
support citizens in serious ones. l This section addresses various
data and policy arguments presented by police unions and others in favor of early dismissal of unworthy cases. Most importantly, these arguments revolve around costs and deterrence.
Groups like the National Association of Police Organizations
("NAPO") argue that litigation against law enforcement has
proliferated over the years and that officers and/or their employers are forced to spend increasing amounts of money defending against frivolous suits.'o They also argue that the specter of a trial negatively affects officers' behavior on the job in a
serious way." The trend of "depolicing" or of civilian municipal
leadership failing to support the efforts of law enforcement has
exacerbated the situation, as was evident from an interview I
conducted with Detective Jesse H. Grant, an Oakland, California, police officer. ,.
Critics contend, however, that the policy arguments, if
anything, tilt in favor of abolishing qualified immunity. Alan
Chen," Barbara Armacost," and others argue that because
agents are indemnified by the government, they have little reason to fear litigation, or at least to allow that fear to impact
their job performance. In addition, some argue that the courts
have moved away from relying on deterrence and have focused
strictly on costs.'· They contend that qualified immunity im40 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Police Organizations and
National Law Enforcement Officers' Rights Center, in Support of the Petitioner at 2,
Saucier u. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 99-1977) (hereinafter NAPOAmicus).
41 [d.
.2 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, Detective, Oakland Police Department's Special Victims Unit, in Somerville, Massachusetts (Jan. 14-16, 2003). Detective Grant
works as a patrolman and an investigator in the Oakland (Calif.) Police Department's
Special Victims Unit. He graciously provided his time and insights for this article.
43 Chen, supra note 13 .
.. Armacost, supra note 13.
'" [d.
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poses more costs, by creating uncertainty and the potential for
interlocutory appeals, than it saves, by terminating lawsuits at
an early stage:6 Upon careful examination of these various
claims, it becomes clear that some form of qualified immunity
is warranted by the policy arguments.
1.

Reducing Costs and Deterring Crime Through Qualified
Immunity

It is hard to deny that the more time police officers spend
at trial defending their conduct, the less time they spend patrolling the streets, the more money their departments expend
in their defense, and the more frequently the officers will second-guess certain behaviors in the heat of the moment. These
drawbacks may well be justified for the sake of society's prevention of tortious and unreasonable conduct on the part of law
enforcement agents. Nevertheless, police agencies, Supreme
Court justices, and some scholars highlight the important role
that qualified immunity can play in reducing unnecessary costs
and in improving deterrence of crime.
In its amicus brief in support of the Saucier petitioner,
NAPO addressed several concerns related to costs and deterrence. 47 It began by asserting that officers currently face too
many lawsuits related to their conduct, litigation that generally is resolved in their favor and therefore wastes taxpayer
time and money!S It pointed to an "ever increasing number of
lawsuits against law enforcement officers" and the threat that
increase poses to the general public interest.49 The increased
threat of lawsuits, according to this argument, deters effective
police performance, thereby diminishing public safety:o NAPO
referred to Justice Scalia's assertion in Anderson v. Creighton5l
that permitting frivolous lawsuits against law enforcement to
go to trial "entaiHs] substantial social costs, including the risk
46

[d.

47

See generally NAPO Amicus, supra note 40.

46

[d. at 2.

49/d.
50 [d, at 7-8.
NAPO claimed that the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Saucier "places
officers at risk of undue interference in the performance of their duties" and "directly
impacts public safety, as officers become reluctant to use any force while restraining,
arresting, or frisking an individual, for fear of being sued for any force that they use."

[d.

.
61

483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties."·2
Several scholars echo NAPO's concerns. Richard Fallon
and Daniel Meltzer describe the fears of the Supreme Court in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,53 explaining that such litigation works its
evils by deterring officers through the threat of personal liability. Barbara Armacost notes that such liability begets poor law
enforcement, which in turn harms the very people the officers
are sworn to protect. The chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy's Legal Instruction Unit echoes these sentiments. 55 Thus, at least in theory, the proliferation oflawsuits
appears to involve serious risks 5s to agents as well as the public.
Of course, this entire edifice hangs on the assumption that
law enforcement agents regularly face personal liability for
their conduct when acting under color of law. Fallon and Meltzer challenge this premise. 57 They contend that in most situations, the police department and/or the officers' union make use
of a legal defense fund while the officer need not expend a
54

62 Id. at 638.
In poetic language, another court found that the danger of being
sued might "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officialsl, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) ..
63 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non·Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1821 (1991).
54 Armacost, supra note 13, at 586. Armacost observes that the system's "unbalanced incentive structure may drive officials toward inaction, underenforcement, delay
and other defensive tactics that limit their personal costs but disadvantage the public."
Id. See also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government 68-77 (1983).
56 Daniel L. Schofield, Personal Liability - the Qualified Immunity Defense, FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin, (March 1990) (no page numbers provided), quoted in NAPO
Amicus, supra note 40, at 11. The FBI Academy's Legal Instruction chief asserts that
"the fear of personal liability can seriously erode this necessary confidence and willingness to act. Even worse, law enforcement officers who have an unrealistic or exaggerated fear of personal liability may become overly timid or indecisive and fail to arrest
or search to the detriment of the public's interest in effective and aggressive law enforcement." Id.
66 NAPO also argues that the increase in lawsuits hampers recruiting efforts. In
its words, "It is no wonder that police departments are having difficulty recruiting
officers, with poor morale being the biggest obstacle to retaining current officers and a
major factor in recruiting new ones." NAPO Amicus, supra note 40, at 3. Fallon and
Meltzer echo this sentiment, noting that the Harlow court feared that a proliferation of
litigation "harmed the public interest by deterring able persons from entering public
service." Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 53, at 182l.
67 Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 53, at 1822.
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penny of his or her own.58 Thus, Fallon and Meltzer contend
that the entire policy argument rests on a false assumption.
Nonetheless, despite the unlikelihood of an officer facing
personal liability, frivolous litigation imposes serious secondary
costs on his or her conduct. First, contributions or premiums
paid to a legal defense insurance plan will likely increase with
the amount of litigation the officer faces. Second, the officer's
career may endure a stain or stigma despite a victory on the
merits of an excessive force case. Third, the department, as the
officer's employer, may impose discipline, whether formal or
informal, on any officer's involvement in litigation, whether
successful or unsuccessful. Suspensions or unpaid leave may
accompany lawsuits faced even by officers who are ultimately
victorious in court. Thus, litigation indeed affects officers' conduct, in the heat of the moment, whether reasonably or not. 59
This effect dovetails with a growing tendency toward "depolicing" that has become prevalent in several of America's urban cores. 60 According to many officers, recent years have seen
an increase in lawsuits and informal complaints brought
against law enforcement, a correlate tendency in departments
to steer officers away from necessarily risky conduct in do-ordie situations, and a concomitant decline in officer morale. 61 In
58 Id. Fallon and Meltzer state that "the notion that constitutional violations are
the private wrongs of individual defendants has always been substantially fictitious."
Id. Armacost agrees with these sentiments, arguing that:

the instrumental rationale has largely ignored or underestimated the impact of
indemnification. If governmental officials do not bear the financial effects of individual liability then, as compared to their private counterparts, they may simply
have less to gain or lose. In other words, given indemnification and absent some
systemic bias, incentives might be balanced such that officials will, in fact, consider all the societal costs and benefits of their actions. If so, governmental liability would present little or no risk of overdeterrence, making qualified immunity
unnecessary.
Armacost, supra note 13, at 586-87.
59 Justice Scalia in a footnote in Anderson provides another justification by challenging the argument that "conscientious officials care only about their personal liability and not the liability of the government they serve." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 n.3.
In other words, law enforcement officers may also have good reason to fear stigma and
fmancial penalties attaching to their employer. In the Anderson context itself, Justice
Scalia went on to find that the plaintiffs did not and could not "reasonably contend that
the programs to which they refer make reimbursements [to defendants) sufficiently
certain and generally available to justify" upsetting the balance of costs the Court has
traditionally relied on. Id.
60 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42.
61Id.
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1981 in the State of California,"2 residents placed 8,686 complaints against peace officers, of which 1,552 or 18% were ultimately sustained. 63 In 2000, Californians recorded 23,395 complaints, of which 2,395 or 10% were sustained. This ballooning of claims - in particular unsuccessful ones65 - is as troubling as it is dramatic. The Oakland, California, Citizens Police Review Board ("CPRB") embodies this deterrent effect. 66
This board provides an independent forum in which aggrieved
citizens can register their complaints about police conduct. At
the same time, Detective Jesse H. Grant, who has had personal
experience appearing before the CPRB, notes that complaints,
more than 80% of which were not sustained in 2002, impose a
serious deterrent effect on police conduct. 68 Officers now more
than ever think twice and act conservatively - although not
necessarily safely - when engaged in violent altercations with
or apprehensions of dangerous suspects. 69
Ironically, the presence of entities like the CPRB undermines the justification for excessive force lawsuits to begin
with: by providing an avenue for voicing grievances over police
conduct, such boards obviate some of the need for civil actions.
Moreover, they reflect the deterrent effect that wide-open public access to disciplinary bodies can breed. Thus, there exist
significant reasons for the courts to grant some kind of immunity to law enforcement officials in order to ensure the contin64

67

62 While nationwide statistics mayor may not support the California data, the
various state attorneys general share the concern of law enforcement across the country. In their amicus brief to Saucier, twenty-seven attorneys general argued that the
case "directly impacts state law enforcement." Brief of The States of Texas, Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 99-1977) (hereinafter Attorneys General Amicus).
63 California State Attorney General's Office, Crime and Delinquency Annual
Report,
Table
56
available
at
http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/canddlcdOO/odb.pdf
54

/d.

65 Based on the same statistics, unsustained claims increased threefold between
1981 and 2000. [d.
66 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42. See also generally City of Oakland Citizens' Police Review Board, 2001 Annual Report (hereinafter CPRB Annual
Report).
67 CPRB Annual Report, supra note 66, at l.
68 [d.
See also City of Oakland Citizens' Police Review Board, 2002 Annual Report, at 5 (hereinafter CPRB 2002 Annual Report).
69 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42.
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ued quality of their work. By increasing the threat of litigation, frivolous lawsuits can serve to deter officers' reasonable
conduct, thus imperiling public safety and upending the delicate balance society seeks between forcefully fighting crime
and respectfully treating all citizens.

2.

Counterarguments: Costs, Not Deterrence

Despite the theoretical existence of the costs described
above, many critics of the qualified immunity regime object
that the concerns are misplaced. These commentators contend
that Supreme Court jurisprudence on qualified immunity has
focused unnecessarily on costs to law enforcement and the judicial system and not enough on deterrence. Furthermore, this
line of reasoning goes, the justices have calculated the cost
equation improperly: the present qualified immunity standard
imposes undue costs on excessive force plaintiffs. The following
discussion presents and responds to these arguments.
Alan Chen argues, first, that such plaintiffs encounter a
system concerned more with costs than with actual deterrence. 70 He asserts that in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,71 the Court
became more concerned with the litigation burdens placed on
the court system than with the financial burdens imposed on
offending officers. 72 Yet, this criticism fails to recognize the relationship between costs and deterrence as a continuum: pressure on one end of the spectrum will ultimately diffuse across
the continuum to the other end. Increasing the costs to the
system, whether directly through personal liability or indirectly through liability imposed on departments or legal funds,
will inevitably, if less immediately, affect the conduct of law
enforcement agents.
Chen also engages the second argument by pointing to the
"secondary burdens" - the "social costs specifically generated
by the litigation of the qualified immunity defense" - faced by
excessive force plaintiffs. The party contending that the offi73

7

'

See generally Chen, supra note 13.
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
72 Chen, supra note 13, at 22.
73 In addition, costs to these funds impose burdens on police unions or on the
departments themselves. Such costs directly affect those institutions and indirectly
impact local and state budgets.
7. Chen, supra note 13, at 99.
70

7l
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cer abused his or her civil rights, according to Chen, must essentially try the case twice: at the pretrial qualified immunity
hearing and then, if successful, at trial.7~ Without a qualified
immunity option, the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, could
save money by proceeding directly to trial. 76 Chen notes that
when a defendant seeks interlocutory relief the costs multiply
further; since qualified immunity decisions may under some
circumstances be appealed before the beginning of trial, such
appeals may consume large amounts of time and money and, as
such, impose great burdens on all parties. 77 These concerns
lead others to denounce qualified immunity as inefficient. 78
These potential costs raise the possibility that qualified
immunity may not actually save time and money.79 Yet, it cannot be forgotten that by short-circuiting unsuccessful lawsuits,
the qualified immunity doctrine conserves time, money, and
judicial resources. Coupled with the very real benefits it can
provide police officers, these savings, however slight, render
qualified immunity an important mechanism for preserving the
balance between effective law enforcement and justice for constitutional tort victims. Having responded to the cost criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine, this article now turns
to the problems that critics have found lurking within the doctrine. The following Part takes up three important criticisms,
offers rebuttals, and presents suggestions for improving qualified immunity.

II. A QUALIFIED DEFENSE: CRITIQUES OF THE DOCTRINE,
RESPONSES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Given that public policy arguments favor the application of
qualified immunity in excessive force cases, what problems
lurk within the doctrine, and how can they best be addressed?
75
76

77

[d. at 99-100.
[d.
[d. at 10l.

78 Blum, supra note 25, at 189. Blum concludes that "the costs of the defense
may outweigh the benefits to such a degree that the defense should be abandoned as an
inefficient allocation of resources." [d.
79 Chen, supra note 13, at 102. Chen writes that "presently, there is no empirical
foundation for the advocates of the present qualified immunity doctrine or its critics."
[d. Such an empirical exploration would no doubt cast light on these issues, although
it may prove difficult for critics and advocates of the doctrine to locate and evaluate the
data in the same way.
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First, many critics, including dissenting supreme court justices,
believe that qualified immunity ineluctably and irrationally
means finding that an officer "reasonably acted unreasonably,"
since his or her actions may have been unreasonable as a matter of fact although he or she reasonably erred in legal interpretation. 80 According to these critics, the qualified immunity
calculus is far too complex and should be reduced, instead, to
an examination of the merits of the case. 81 Yet, the "surface
appeal" of this argument, in Justice Scalia's felicitous phrase,
is merely semantic. 82 Under armacost's eloquent comparison of
fault and notice, as a matter of fairness, it is possible to reasonably act unreasonably.83 This fairness is related to the question of exactly what qualified immunity immunizes against; the
doctrine, by seeking to dispose of cases at summary judgment,
constitutes for the most part immunity from trial.
Second, others, primarily Chen, believe that the unique
nature of the factual and legal inquiry of qualified immunity
jurisprudence renders it ill-suited for summary judgment disposition. 84 As a combination of law and fact, this argument contends that qualified immunity inherently demands findings of
fact. These factual issues, however, can be set aside or taken
in the plaintiff's favor, in almost every case, leaving the judge
well-positioned to find "reasonableness" as a matter of law.55
Nevertheless, this critique presents a different factual problem
that cannot be swept aside as easily. Because the factual first
prong is often so critical, plaintiffs may simply allege sufficiently egregious facts in order to clear the summary judgment
hurdle, thereby rendering the qualified immunity doctrine almost useless. In such cases, a limited discovery process designed to address only the immunity fmding would solve many
problems.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, this Part explores
how the entire qualified immunity doctrine turns critically on
the meaning of "clearly established. "86 Depending on the thoroughness and specificity of the requirement, courts mayor may
80

See infra Part II-A.

8I

[d.

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643.
Armacost, supra note 13, at 620.
54 See infra Part II-B .
.. Karen Blum argues similarly. See Blum, supra note 25, at 208, 225.
86 See infra Part II-C.
82

83
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not find a law to be clearly established. Building on the work
of several scholars, interpreting the relevant case law, and considering police departmental guidelines reveals a reasonable
and useful definition of clear establishment and can help dispel
confusion and inconsistencies. First, it is critical to examine
the issue of "double reasonableness."
A.

How CONDUCT CAN BE "REASONABLY UNREASONABLE"

The first major criticism leveled against the qualified immunity doctrine relates to the idea of double-counting reasonableness. According to this argument, the doctrine permits a
law enforcement agent to act unreasonably as a matter of fact,
under a Fourth Amendment or other standard, but to do so
reasonably as a matter oflaw. This "reasonably unreasonable"
conduct, according to critics, offends not only an appropriate
sense of justice and balance in the system but also basic logic.
Yet, despite what Justice Scalia in Anderson calls the "surface
appeal" of this argument,s7 it poses only a minor, semantic obstacle to a proper and just understanding of the doctrine.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Anderson, appears to have
been among the first to provide this critique. ss In his language,
the Court appeared to "approve a double standard of reasonableness - the constitutional standard already embodied in the
Fourth Amendment and an even more generous standard that
protects any officer who reasonably could have believed that
his conduct was constitutionally reasonable."s9 According to the
dissent, this double-insulation of the officer from liability comports neither with justice nor with fundamentallogic. 90 Justice
Stevens, who earlier contended "an official search and seizure
cannot be both 'unreasonable' and 'reasonable' at the same
time,""' argued in Anderson that the Court counted "the law
enforcement interest twice and the individual's privacy interest
only once. »92 Thus, he stated, there exist reasons of basic fair-

87 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643 .
.. Id. at 648.
89

[d.

Id.
U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 960 (1984).
82 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 664.
00

9'
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ness and linguistic integrity to reject the majority's articulation
of the qualified immunity doctrine. 93
Yet, despite the pedigree of this argument,9. it fails to pass
muster as a genuine objection. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority in Anderson, noted that the seeming illogic of "doublereasonableness" in the Fourth Amendment context - which
through its "unreasonable seizure" language governs excessive
force cases - results from the collision of a fortuity with a twopart test. 9• To be sure, the qualified immunity doctrine involves
factual and legal determinations, one directed to the conduct
itself and the other to the application of relevant law to the
facts. While this second determination, according to the Court,
always involves a finding of reasonableness, the standard for
the first, factual finding depends on the relevant conduct. In
the Fourth Amendment context, since the Constitution bars
"unreasonable" searches and seizures, the factual standard,
like the legal one, is one of reasonableness. In Justice Scalia's
words, "had an equally serviceable term, such as 'undue'
searches and seizures been employed, what might be termed
the 'reasonably unreasonable' argument ... would not be available."S6 The linguistic misfortune of the double-reasonableness
standard derives more from happenstance than from an inherent illogic. Put differently, in the context of tort law, the factual reasonability - if such is the relevant standard - applies to
the breach portion of the analysis while the legal reasonability
pertains to the duty."7
In the particular context of excessive force cases, the need
for both legal and factual insulation from liability becomes
clear. Technically, the "unreasonable ... seizure"S8 involved in
an excessive force case is the force itself: it is constitutionally
[d.
Alan Chen provides a similar objection. Chen, supra note 13, at 50-52.
96 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643.
96 [d. at 643.
rTI In its Saucier brief, NAPO offered a similar argument.
The Association argued, quite simply, that "a police officer's conduct may be unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment but nevertheless objectively reasonable for qualified immunity purposes." NAPO Amicus, supra note 40, at 17. Likewise, the state
attorneys general, in equating Fourth Amendment search cases to seizure incidents,
asserted that "reasonable mistakes that cause unreasonable searches are analytically
indistinguishable from reasonable mistakes that cause unreasonable uses of force."
Attorneys General Amicus, supra note 62, at 11 .
.. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
93

o.
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unreasonable to seize control of a suspect's body with greater
force than is necessary.99 Thus, the Constitution enjoins a police officer to employ only reasonable force in subduing an individuaL Yet, this objective legal standard provides the officer
precious little guidance absent the further clarification required by the "clear establishment"100 element of the qualified
immunity calculus - for instance, a rule that an officer may not
use deadly force against a fleeing suspect unless the suspect
poses a mortal or highly dangerous risk to others. The officer
must then apply the relevant guidelines - in which constitutional reasonableness is embedded - to the facts at hand, an
application that he or she can make either reasonably or unreasonably.
Put differently, there exist three main possibilities when a
court is considering a defendant's conduct at a qualified immunity summary judgment hearing, two of which will end the litigation in the officer's favor and one of which will compel proceeding to trial and full-fledged discovery.101 The first possibility is that, under the plaintiffs version of the facts, the officer's
actions comported with the factual requirements of the given
conduct, such as a "reasonable search" of a suspect's home. In
such an instance, the case would end since the defendant has
established, on Saucier's first prong, that his or her behavior
implicated no constitutional concerns. The second possibility is
that, again under the plaintiffs version of the facts, the officer's
conduct might have violated the rules governing those actions
as a matter of fact. But at the same time, the law in that particular area might not have been clearly established, thus rendering reasonable his or her otherwise problematic application
of law to fact. This situation, of "reasonable misconduct" whether the standard for the misconduct itself is reasonableness, undueness, gross negligence, etc. - would also result in
early termination of the litigation since the officer would prevail on the second prong of Saucier. The third possibility is
that the officer's conduct might, under the plaintiffs version of
the facts, be factually problematic with clearly established law
See u.s. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 51 (1993).
See infra Part 11- C.
101 Interview with William Stuntz, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, in
Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 7, 2003). William Stuntz developed this approach, upon which
the author expands.
99

100
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demonstrating, without question, its wrongfulness. In such a
situation, if the defendant officer's version of the facts would
put the case within the first possibility (i.e., no factual misconduct), a genuine issue of fact would exist and a trial would be
necessary to resolve the conflict between the plaintiffs and defendant's versions of what happened.
Other scholars echo this view of the relevance of fairness to
the legal prong of the qualified immunity test by noting that it
would be unreasonable to expect police officers to make heat-ofthe-moment decisions in the excessive force context that somehow take into account the niceties oflegal balancing tests. '02 In
Armacost's understanding, "limiting constitutional damages
liability to cases involving truly blameworthy conduct may best
preserve the moral force of such liability.",oa An officer, in other
words, should not be faulted for an inability to apply law that is
not clearly established to the specifics of the altercation in
which he or she is involved.'O< Thus, the "reasonably unreasonable" challenge, while helping to elucidate the complex doctrine
of qualified immunity, fails to invalidate it. While it may appear superficially that conduct cannot simultaneously be reasonable and unreasonable, in fact it can.
B.

MIXTURE OF FACT AND LAw

1.

Summary Judgment, According To Critics, Is An Inappropriate Stage At Which To Consider Qualified Immunity

Despite the doctrine's escape from the doublereasonableness objection, it is precisely its dual requirements
of factual and legal findings that leave it susceptible to the objection that pretrial summary judgment is inappropriate. Alan
Chen, among others, observes that the mixture of fact and law
required in a qualified immunity determination renders it seriously unfit for disposition at summary judgment. 105 In the ex102 Armacost, supra note 13, at 661.
Armacost asserts that this second stage of
clear establishment is necessary "because governmental officials are not blameworthy
if their only error was in failing to predict how the courts would view the balance of
interests that dermes a constitutional use of force." [d.
loa [d. at 680.
104 [d.
105 See generally Chen, supra note 13.
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cessive force context in particular, in which factual disputes
and permutations abound, one might question whether a jury
ought to determine whether the officer can invoke immunity.
On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy observed in Saucier,
once the case is allowed to go to trial, the defendant officer effectively loses his or her immunity.,oa Factual objections notwithstanding, a judge in an excessive force case, as in any
summary judgment hearing, ordinarily can consider undisputed facts and interpret disputed ones in the plaintiff's favor
for the sake of assessing the legal issues involved. '07
To begin with, one wonders whether the judges involved in
the Saucier case engaged in fact-finding or simply interpreted
factual questions appropriately. It appears striking that Judge
Thompson of the Ninth Circuit read the facts differently from
Justice Kennedy and the majority, who in turn interpreted
them differently again from the concurring justices.
Thus,
three different sets of judges emerged with three different
readings of the facts. This suggests either that they dabbled in
some fact-finding of their own or that there does not appear to
be a consistent way of interpreting the facts of the Saucier case
for the purposes of summary judgment.
Chen asserts that precisely this kind of confusion frequently reigns in qualified immunity determinations. 109 He
notes that even the Anderson court acknowledged the "factspecific" nature of the qualified immunity inquiry.Ho Chen also
quotes a district court opinion to the effect that "it often will be
lOB

")6 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-1 (2001). Yet, while immunity may
disappear, strictly speaking, the defendant can invoke a defense of qualified immunity
even at trial. The critical question, again, is whether the case should be allowed to
proceed to trial and the costs and benefits involved in that decision.
107 During a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determines whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact. Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
108 Recall that the Ninth Circuit believed that Saucier's actions in subduing Katz
were objectively unreasonable; reading the facts in a light favorable to Katz, Judge
Thompson concluded that no reasonable officer could have behaved as Saucier did. In
reversing the Ninth Circuit, the majority of the Supreme Court, however, pointed to
"the uncontested fact that the force was not so excessive that respondent suffered hurt
or injury." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209. And the concurring justices cleared Saucier of
wrongdoing only because "at no point did Katz say specifically, that Saucier himself ...
pushed or shoved" him. [d. at 212. These vastly different readings of the facts are
surprising, to say the least.
109 Chen, supra note 13, at 37.
110 [d. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).
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impossible to assess the objective reasonableness of the defendant's conduct without a resolution of the factual disputes surrounding the incident from which the action arises."1ll He argues further that even the legal prong of the analysis - i.e.,
whether the relevant law was clearly established - depends on
a determination of historical or "ultimate" fact - i.e., how
clearly established the law actually was at the time of the incident. 112
Yet, again, despite the "surface appeal" of this objection, it
admits of a fairly straightforward resolution. David Ignall offers a simple and compelling rejoinder to this objection."3 An
excessive force defendant moving for summary judgment can
prevail only if, on the basis of undisputed facts or disputed
facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
judge concludes as a matter of law that no violation took
place. 114 The plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts that, if
supported, would substantiate his or her claim of a constitutional violation; but if the plaintiff cannot proffer such facts, his
or her case will fail. 115
111 Chen, supra note 13, at 41 (quoting McGaughey v. City of Chicago, 664 F.
Supp. 1131, 1138 (N.D. lll. 1987».
lllI Chen, supra note 13, at 40.
'13 David Ignall, Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and
Issues for the Trier of Fact, 30 Cal. W. L. Rev. 201, 203 (1994).
'" Id. Ignall observes that "the defendant loses his shield of immunity not when
the plaintiff can create a question about which reasonable minds could differ, but when
the facts are sufficiently egregious so that reasonable minds, including the defendant's,
could not differ as to the legality of the defendant's actions." Id. at 215. See generally
Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004).
115 Ignall, supra note 113, at 215. Blum, supra note 25, at 208. Blum provides a
helpful table of the different possibilities at summary judgment. She writes that:
A district court's denial of a qualified immunity summary judgment motion must embrace the following conclusions of law:

(1) The plaintiff has asserted a valid constitutional claim upon which relief may be
granted;
(2) The constitutional right defendant allegedly violated was clearly established at
the time of the challenged conduct;
(3) When the facts are undisputed, a reasonable officer, given the facts and circumstances confronting this officer at the time, would have understood her conduct to have violated plaintiffs clearly established right;
(4) When the facts are in dispute:
(a) looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable officer would have understood her conduct to have violated plaintiff's
clearly established constitutional rights OR
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The hypothetical situation depicted previously in this article illustrates this point. 116 Most law enforcement agencies recognize some form of the rule that a peace officer may use
deadly force to subdue a fleeing suspect only if that suspect
poses a serious and imminent danger to the officer or to others.1I7 Thus, in order to overcome a defendant officer's qualified
immunity summary judgment motion, a plaintiff shot in the
back by the officer would need to allege that he or she posed no
imminent danger to anyone, and that the officer used deadly
force. Whether the facts are undisputed or simply viewed in a
light favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would clear the
first, factual prong of the immunity inquiry. The plaintiff would
also pass the second element of the test, since the rule barring
the unreasonable conduct was clearly established at the time of
the incident. Chen's worries about factual determinations are
therefore misplaced: as at any summary judgment hearing, no
factual findings are made. Instead, the judge simply accepts
undisputed facts and views the disputed ones in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party18 - in this case, the plaintiff.
So too can the seemingly contradictory "interpretations" of
the Saucier facts be resolved. The Ninth Circuit simply applied
the qualified immunity test incorrectly, effectively collapsing
the pretrial inquiry into a case on its merits. 1I9 In so doing, the
court easily made a fmding of objective unreasonableness. The
Supreme Court majority, however, never actually reached a
finding of fact, whether undisputed or otherwise, because it
announced that Katz's claim failed the second, legal prong of
clearly established law. 120 Finally, the concurrence, motivated
by the logic of the Ninth Circuit, nevertheless concluded that
the plaintiff's failure explicitly to state a claim that could warrant relief - in this case his neglecting to name the defendant

(b) even accepting the defendant's version of the facts, a reasonable officer
would have understood her conduct to have violated plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights.
[d. at 225.

See supra Parts I, II-A.
See Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42.
118 See Holley v. Crank, 386 F.3d 1248, 1255 (9th Cir. 2004).
119 See Katz v. U.S., 194 F.2d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2000).
120 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,209 (2001).
116

117
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as the shover - doomed his case. 121 Indeed, the concurrence
found facts different from those of the Ninth Circuit, yet this
discrepancy between what should be consistent findings may
simply reflect the perceptive eye of Justice Ginsburg.
But what of Chen's contention that even the legal prong
depends on factual findings? Indeed, strictly speaking, determining whether clearly established law in a given area existed
at a particular time has factual elements to it. Yet, the clear
establishment question fundamentally and overwhelmingly
revolves around legal interpretation, albeit with residual elements of fact. As would any issue that can be resolved as a
matter of law, a finding that a given law or rule was not clearly
established should short-circuit a suit at the summary judgment stage.
In terms of the example above, whether a rule that prohibits using deadly force against a suspect in the absence of exigent circumstances was clearly established admittedly involves
asking questions that involve facts. Such questions might include: How widespread was this rule? Was the average police
officer aware of it? What was its source? Was it statutory?
Did it derive from case law? Still, these questions are stereotypically those that a judge would ask in an effort to understand the state of the law, not the kinds of inquiries a jury
would conduct. To be fair to Chen, however, the concept of
clear establishment remains extremely murky, a problem that
will be addressed later.122 Nevertheless, it dwells in the realm
of the legal and therefore represents an appropriate target for
early judicial disposition.
Thus, the objection that granting qualified immunity infringes an excessive force plaintiff's rights has been parried.
But what if the current summary judgment arrangement
threatens the rights of the accused officer? The existing formulation leaves the qualified immunity doctrine seriously vulnerable because a savvy plaintiff would surely allege facts that
render the officer's conduct a constitutional violation, assuming
the law was clearly established. 123 In such a situation, the deSee [d. at 212.
See infra Part II-C.
123 This last condition is not insignificant, but for the purposes of this section the
clear establishment prong will be put on hold, assuming that it is met. Controlling the
"clearly established" requirement will permit careful inspection of the role of facts and
121

122
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fendant officer would rarely prevail at summary judgment.
While some scholars might applaud such a result, it raises the
question of what function the doctrine performs.
It is useful to return to the example!24 of the plaintiff whom
the defendant officer shot in the back. Assume that the rule
prohibiting using deadly force against fleeing suspects except
in cases of exigency was indeed clearly established at the time
of the shooting and that the defendant should reasonably have
known about it. At the qualified immunity hearing, the plaintiff will simply allege that he or she posed no danger to anyone
else, and that the defendant used deadly force. The judge will
credit the plaintiffs allegations for the purposes of summary
judgment and decline to award the defendant summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs in excessive force
cases, therefore, have every incentive to claim particularly and
perhaps exaggeratedly egregious behavior in order to clear
summary judgment.!'s

discovery. However, to the extent that the second prong involves some degree of resolution of factual issues, such as whether a law was as a matter of fact clearly established and whether the defendant should reasonably have applied it to his or her situation, those issues are considered here too; such factual elements of the legal issue may
also require a mini-discovery to resolve fairly and fmally. For instance, in Prokey v.
Watkins, 942 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1991) the First Circuit drew precisely such a distinction,
finding that:
Whether . . . a reasonable policeman, on the basis of the information known to
him, could have believed there was probable cause is a question of law, subject to
resolution by the judge not the jury.... [I]f what the policeman knew prior to the
arrest is genuinely in dispute, and if a reasonable officer's perception of probable
cause would differ depending on the correct version, that factual dispute must be
resolved by a fact fmder.

Id. at 73. In other words, there indeed exist factual elements of the legal prong of the
qualified immunity analysis that may require resolution through full-fledged fact finding.
124 See supra Part I.
125 The judge might reduce incentives for the plaintiff to exaggerate the alleged
conduct either by imposing sanctions, later at trial, for statements later found to be
wantonly hyperbolic, or, perhaps more practically, by requiring the plaintiff to meet a
certain burden of production in order to proceed. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
already provide a method of punishing frivolous lawsuits and the threat of perjury
prosecution would help to ensure truthful statements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. l1(b). In
addition, the court could raise the evidentiary bar for proceeding to trial by, for instance, compelling the plaintiff to establish a prima facie violation by clear and convincing evidence. This would likely require a somewhat abrupt change in common law,
a formal alteration of the federal rules, or congressional action, but could be of great
use in winnowing meritless suits. For instance, in patent law an infringement defendant seeking to invalidate a plaintiffs patent must do so by clear and convincing evi-
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Summary Judgment and Discovery in Qualified Immunity
Cases Can Be Improved

a. Bifurcating the Trial or Submitting Qualified Immunity
Facts to a Jury
Several scholars and judges have noticed this problem and
have proposed various solutions. Ignall argues for doing away
with pretrial qualified immunity hearings, sending the case
directly to the jury instead, and bifurcating the jury's responsibility into the immunity findings and the case on the merits. 126
This would permit the jurors to make the relevant factual findings while still terminating the litigation at an early stage,
prior to considering its merits. 127 In a different approach, Blum
suggests furnishing the jury at a unified trial- i.e., one considering the case's merits and any immunity defense - with interrogatories aimed at a qualified immunity finding. 128 In her approach, the jury could receive special interrogatories on facts
related to qualified immunity; based on the jury's findings, the
judge could decide the ultimate legal question of whether the
doctrine applies. 129 This division of labor would allow the jury
to make the appropriate factual findings but would reserve the
legal ruling for the judge. 130
Yet, while both of the above suggestions contain promise,
they also suffer from important drawbacks. Ignall's proposed
trial bifurcation would indeed engage the jury in a fact-finding
exercise and would postpone the most intensive part of the trial
- the case on the merits - until after a qualified immunity finding. Unfortunately, this bifurcation proposal would still require selecting and dealing with a jury, in effect constituting a
mini-trial. The involvement of a jury would appropriately resolve important issues and may deter a plaintiff from alleging
exaggerated facts, but by tilting too far toward an actual trial,
this approach would effectively deprive the defendant of pretrial immunity. Likewise, Blum's suggestion of jury interrogadence. See Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
126 Ignall, supra note 113, at 216-7.
127 [d.
128 Blum, supra note 25, at 226.
129 [d.
130 [d.
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tories nicely reserves a factual role for a jury and a legal one for
a judge but suffers from a similar deficiency: by waiting until
trial to determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate,
the interrogatory plan similarly squanders the savings that the
doctrine would ordinarily provide.
b.

Restricting Discovery

A more promising alternative involves engaging a judgeled abbreviated discovery before a hearing upon a motion for
qualified immunity summary judgment. If appropriately limited, such a mini-discovery would resolve tricky factual issues
and forestall a plaintiffs hyperbolic factual charges. All the
while, this mini-discovery would also maintain the doctrine's
conservation of judicial resources and protection of law enforcement defendants. Such discovery could be restrained to
questions pertaining only to the qualified immunity test and
thereby avoid the problems associated with full-blown, openended trial-caliber discovery. This idea appears to have first
been broached by the Court in Anderson. There, Justice Scalia
wrote in a footnote that:
If the actions [the defendant] claims he took are different
from those [the plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery
may be necessary before [the defendant's] motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity can be resolved. Of
course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to
the question of [the defendant's] qualified immunity!31

Thus, the possibility of mini-discovery receives significant support, albeit in a footnote, from the Supreme Court. 132 Further-

131
132

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6.
Blum suggests a similar idea, noting that:

In some cases, factual disputes can be resolved prior to trial simply by allowing
limited discovery to proceed on the facts crucial to the qualified immunity defense.
Rather than deny qualified immunity at this early stage (which inevitably leads to
delay and more expense in the form of an interlocutory appeal), the district court
should simply defer its decision on qualified immunity until the material facts are
sufficiently developed or clarified so that a decision can be made at the summary
judgment stage.

Blum, supra note 25, at 207-8.
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more, abbreviated discovery should provide an added benefit by
saving time and money for both plaintiff and defendant.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain abundant authority for limiting discovery when appropriate. In general, the
catchall discovery rule outlines the normal course that discovery takes "[u]nless otherwise limited by order of the court in
accordance with these rule s.
In addition, a district court
may enter, upon the motion of any party, any protective order
"which justice requires.",34 Even without the parties' presentation of any motions, the court is empowered to quash or modify
third-party subpoenas as it sees fit under certain circumstances.'35 Finally, while in most federal litigation the parties
are required to provide certain initial disclosures of documents,
damages, and planned expert testimony, those burdens are
lifted from certain actions and litigants. 136 In short, the Federal
Rules generally contemplate the need to adjust the otherwise
onerous obligations of discovery when appropriate.
This tendency can be seen, in particular, in two instances.
In patent litigation, a determination of whether a patent is infringed l37 or invalid l38 depends heavily on the interpretation of
the patents' claims, or the exact nature of the invention at issue. In order to provide a jury of laypeople with a clear statement of what the invention claims, most district judges hold a
"Markman hearing," named after a landmark patent case establishing that judges determine the meaning of a patent's
claims as a matter of law. 139 Different courts hold Markman
hearings, on the results of which the entire litigation may turn,
at often vastly different stages of discovery, some on the very
eve of trial. 140 What this illustrates is that the courts have wide
discretion to tailor critical portions of discovery to suit the
needs of a particular area of practice.
",33

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
135 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B).
136 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E)(i-viii).
137 35 U.S.C. § 271.
138 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
139 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
140 David C. Doyle & Richard C. Kim, Determining The Scope Of Patent Rights
(Claim Construction) In Southern Cal., (Fed. Bar Assoc. Newsletter), San Diego Chapter 2003, at 4.
133
134
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Another example can be found in trade secret litigation.
Under California law, when a party sues for trade secret misappropriation, the plaintiff cannot commence discovery until he
or she identifies with "reasonable particularity" the contents of
the trade secret itself. l<1 The purposes of this provision include
"assist[ing] the court in framing the appropriate scope of discovery," permitting the defendant to formulate a well-reasoned
defense, and generally preventing a trade secret plaintiff from
embarking on a "fishing expedition" designed to harass a competitor defendant. 142 The provision is binding on federal courts
as well as California courts. 143 Thus, there exist mechanisms
for federal courts to impose appropriate limits upon otherwise
untamed discovery. Such limits could be applied to the area of
qualified immunity determinations in excessive force cases as
well.
To be sure, the mini-discovery alternative in this context is
not without its problems. First and foremost, both Blum l44 and
Chen l45 question whether discovery can be limited in any meaningful way. Chen observes that "the facts relevant to the immunity issue will be precisely the same facts necessary for the
evaluation of liability" on the merits. 146 Because the "substantive constitutional law inquiry and the qualified immunity inquiry are intertwined," contends Chen, there can be no principled distinction between full-fledged discovery and one limited
to the immunity question.147
It is possible, however, to outline limiting principles that
could regulate an abbreviated discovery. First, the judge may
restrict discovery on the legal prong of the analysis to the factual issues contained therein, for example, the sources of law
that would establish whether the conduct in question was prohibited by clearly established law. 148 While, to be sure, a trial
jury could also be charged with finding such facts, the judge
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210 (West 2005).
Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985
(S.D. Cal. 1999).
143 [d. at 991; see also Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142,
147 (2d Cir. 1996); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1325-26 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
144 Blum, supra note 25, at 208-9.
145 Chen, supra note 13, at 74.
141

I" Computer

1..

ld.

147

Id.

148

See infra Part II-C.
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could order limited discovery, with the judge as fact-finder, revolving around those circumstances. In this regard, documentary discovery could be restricted to directives and regulations"9 available to the officer from the police department at the
time of the incident. The plaintiff could also be permitted to
propound interrogatories 150 upon the officer and to request admissions 151 related to whether the officer knew or should have
known that his or her conduct was impermissible. The plaintiff
could also seek discovery into the practices that the police department employs to share relevant legal information with its
officers. Ultimately, either side could move for summary
judgment or partial summary judgment, at which point the
judge would decide whether the law proscribing the officer's
behavior was clearly established at the time of the incident.
Second, the judge could open discovery to the factual issues
involved in whether the officer's conduct violated clearly established law but limit the kinds of evidence that could be adduced
to affidavits and eyewitness testimony, for instance. In a typical summary judgment motion, the parties introduce declarations of undisputed matters. 152 In addition, the court must view
disputed matters in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.163 Thus, if the officer moves for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds, the plaintiff can avoid summary
judgment by introducing sworn declarations testifying to his or
her version of the events - assuming, of course, that the plaintiff's version substantiates a violation of clearly established
law. This arrangement would empower the plaintiff but also
require him or her to submit statements sworn under penalty
of perjury, unlike a complaint in which bare allegations can be
presented.
In addition, by excluding other forms of evidence - say, forensic or ballistic reports - the judge could conserve time and
money by adjudicating only the reliability of various sworn
statements. Hiring independent experts to pore over test results can occupy many months and can cost the parties tens of
149

In federal court, parties obtain documentary discovery through Fed. R. Civ. P.

34.
150
151
152

153

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.
See Orsini v. O/S Seabrooke O.N., 247 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2001).
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996).
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thousands of dollars. While certain tests might ultimately become necessary at trial, the judge could reasonably limit discovery to weighing the sworn statements the parties submit. 154
Alternatively, the court, with the parties' consent, could choose
its own ballistics or forensic expert to render an unbiased opinion. Through abbreviated discovery, judges could weed out
frivolous claims at an early stage of litigation, while still providing plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to move forward. Having formulated an abbreviated version of discovery that resolves factual issues while conserving resources and protecting
law enforcement defendants, this article moves on to explore
what exactly defines a law as "clearly established."
C.

MORE CLEARLY DEFINING "CLEAR ESTABLlSHM:ENT"

1.

The Current State of the Law Leaves "Clear Establishment"
Anything But

Once the judge has resolved the factual issues involved in
the first prong of the analysis, he or she must confront the requirement that the relevant law be clearly established. This
section will explain how specifically the "clearly established"
law must be defined and what sources of law qualify. The
touchstone of clear establishment involves enabling an officer
to identify the "clear contours" of the law, a term that should
include analogous case law and departmental directives. First,
though, it is useful to examine how the courts have interpreted
"clear establishment."
Judge Thompson, in the Ninth Circuit Saucier opinion, offered a fairly expansive view of clear establishment that appeared limited only by the Fourth Amendment's injunction
against "unreasonable search and seizure" and a vague balancing test. 155 As previously recounted, Justice Scalia in Anderson,
echoed by Justice Kennedy in Saucier, stated,156 "the contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear.",57 However, this confusion,
combined with the ambiguity of the term "clear contours,"
I" The judge might also, more radically, admit direct and cross-examination only
of the parties involved - the defendant officer and the excessive force plaintiff. This
option might require an amendment to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1M See Katz v. U.S., 194 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1999).
1M See supra Part IT-A.
167 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
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hardly defines the limits of clear establishment if at all. Blum
observes that, according to several circuit court decisions,
"when the right in question is subject to a balancing test, the
right will rarely be found clearly established. m68 Yet, says
Blum, "even within the same circuit, there is not always
agreement on whether the contours of the right have been
clearly established. m69 Nevertheless, the meaning of "clear establishment" need not vary according to the details and context
of every particular case.

2.

Outlining the Contours of Clear Establishment

Instead, by piecing together portions of Supreme Court
opinions, the ideas of various scholars, and public policy considerations, it is possible to formulate a useful and uniform understanding of clearly established law. The definition of the
elusive term should encompass statutes, judge-made law,
analogous cases, and even relevant police department regulations designed to interpret and give effect to recent court rulings. These various sources of law provide a range of different
areas with which society can expect its law enforcement agents
to be familiar. Finally, as Barbara Armacost suggests, the
clearly established law requirement should be relaxed to include an exception for truly egregious conduct.
To begin with, directly applicable statutes appear to be
squarely within the contemplation of the Court in its language
of "clear contours." Analogous case law, and by extension
clearly on-point case law, are explicitly mentioned in Saucier.
There, Justice Kennedy stated that:
Assuming, for instance, that various courts have agreed that
certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not
distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the
case at hand, the officer would not be entitled to qualified
immunity based simply on the argument that courts had not
agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling standard. 16o

Blum, supra note 25, at 200 and accompanying cases in n.58.
[d. at 202.
160 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202-3.
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The Court thus provides some guidance in defining clearly established law by accepting the role of indistinguishable facts as
a valid form of such law. In this way, judicial determination
of the legal prong at a qualified immunity hearing may revolve
around competing briefs, alternately equating and distinguishing the facts of a relevant case from those in the situation at
hand. In another recent case, the Supreme Court stated that
the purpose of the "clearly established" language is to provide
law enforcement with "fair warning" that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances. 162
The Fourth Amendment and excessive force contexts seem
particularly well suited to analogous law determinations. As
Ignall notes, criminal defendants have helped place Fourth
Amendment issues among the most litigated in the country by
challenging various rules and thereby helping to clarify the
substantive law of criminal procedure. l63 Detective Grant avers
that officers in the Oakland Police Department, as well as
those in several others in Northern California, receive monthly
bulletins from the county district attorney keeping them apprised of recent developments in relevant case law.'64 These
updates should serve the notice function that, according to Armacost, ensures the fair treatment of defendant officers. 165
But what about consistency among the circuits? Analogizing cases with similar facts should extend to litigation drawn
from outside of the circuit in which the hearing is held. Just as
in most cases, applicable or analogous rulings inside a given
circuit are considered dispositive while those from outside the
circuit are persuasive, so too should cases offering analogous
rules, standards, or facts enjoy dispositive value, if inside the
circuit, or persuasive value, if outside. Unfortunately, Blum
finds that there exist wide discrepancies in how different circuits defer to the clear establishment jurisprudence of their
lsl

See also Armacost, supra note 13, at 633.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002).
163 Ignall, supra note 113, at 218.
164 Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42.
160 Armacost quotes a First Circuit opinion asserting that "whether the right was
reasonably well settled at the time of the challenged conduct and whether the manner
in which the right related to the conduct was apparent.... [C]ourts may neither require that state actors faultlessly anticipate the future trajectory of the law nor permit
claims of qualified immunity to turn on the eventual outcome of a hitherto problematic
constitutional analysis." Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 988 (lst Cir. 1995), quoted in
Armacost, supra note 13, at 620.
161

162
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sister circuits, with the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits being the least deferential. l66 It is therefore important to ensure
that the different circuits give at least some effect to clear establishment rulings in all federal appellate courts; such a move
might require amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure or the rules of precedent of the individual circuits.
This may not ensure uniformity of "clearly established law"
across all circuits but it will promote some amount of consistency.
As for excessive force balancing tests, it would be unrealistic to expect officers in the heat of the moment to balance various public policy arguments. Armacost quotes a Seventh Circuit case to this effect, arguing that:
differences in the nature of the competing interests from case
to case make it difficult for a governmental official to determine, in the absence of case law that is very closely analogous, whether the balance he strikes is an appropriate accommodation of the competing individual and governmental
interests. '67

Still, officers should be aware of the relevant case law involved
in those balancing tests and capable of applying the same logic
to the situation they face. Armacost sums this up nicely in her
own words, stating that:
qualified immunity protects from liability an official whose
only error was in failing to predict how courts would evaluate
the relevant competing interests. If, however, an official can
be charged with ''knowledge of the law" via the surrogate of
"previously-decided case(s) with clearly analogous facts," that
official will be deemed blameworthy and qualified immunity
will be denied. 168

Blum, supra note 25, at 203-05.
Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1994), quoted in Armacost, supra
note 13, at 650. The Gregorich court also noted that "governmental officials are not
expected to be prescient and are not liable for damages simply because they legitimately but mistakenly believed that the balancing of interests tipped in the State's
favor." Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 414-5.
168 Armacost, supra note 13, at 650-51(quoting Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848
(lst Cir. 1987».
166
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Eschewing balancing tests as grounds for clearly established
law poses no serious problems so long as analogous factual
situations can form the basis for a fmding of clearly established
law. IB9
In addition to analogous cases, clearly established law
should also encompass the various rules and regulations formulated by individual police departments or county prosecutors. Detective Grant notes that Oakland police officers are
responsible for learning and obeying departmental rules as
well as for participating in ongoing and regular training seminars. 170 Any such departmental rules that concern constitutional conduce71 - whether they involve searches, arrest, or the
use of force - should be considered clearly established law for
qualified immunity purposes. After all, officers are on notice in
theory and in practice of these regulations and it is perfectly
fair to hold them responsible for following the rules. While
such regulations may exceed the constitutional floor for determining Fourth Amendment violations, they offer instructive
help in defining what constitutes a clearly established law.
These considerations can profitably be applied to our hypothetical case of the suspect shot in the back. In such a case, the
plaintiff, in order to escape summary judgment on the legal
prong, could pursue any number of avenues in order to show
the clear establishment of the law barring the officer's conduct.
The rule forbidding the use of deadly force against a fleeing
suspect, absent exigency, could be formulated as a statute.
Short of that, it could emerge as a standard from particular
cases, whether inside or outside the circuit. It may also be
nothing more than a vague statement in dictum, but cases with
identical or similar fact patterns may apply to render it clearly
established. Finally, individual police departments may issue
regulations reciting a rule barring such conduct. In any such
instance, the plaintiff ought to prevail at the qualified immunity hearing.
One exception should apply to this understanding of
clearly established law as well as to the qualified immunity
Armacost, supra note 13, at 650-51.
Interview with Jesse H. Grant, supra note 42.
171 Regulations regarding non-constitutional matters, such as attire or hygiene
requirements, would, of course, not qualify as clearly established law or form the basis
for a private cause of action.
169
170
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calculus in general. Armacost argues that certain conduct,
based on facts alleged by an excessive force plaintiff, can be so
egregious as to obviate summary judgment entirely.l7ll Such
conduct, resembling behavior that fails the "shocks-theconscience" test of due process, can be defined, according to
Armacost, as "contain [ing] indicia of its own blameworthiness. "173 In other words, the conduct, as alleged, is so plainly
impermissible that clearly established law is unnecessary to
establish a constitutional violation. Armacost cites, by way of
example, a case in which an officer held a gun to a nine-yearold child's head, threatening to pull the trigger, despite the absence of a threat to the safety of anyone.''' The court there refused to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, despite the
absence of a precisely analogous case, since "[i]t would create
perverse incentives indeed if a qualified immunity defense
could succeed against those types of claims that have not previously arisen because the behavior alleged is so egregious that
no like case is on the books.''''· In other words, it is important
to place certain limits on conduct that is especially repulsive
but that is described in no previous case, since failing to do so
would simply invite that egregious behavior.17. Setting that exception aside, this subsection has developed and clarified the
ill-defined idea of "clearly established law." By drawing on
statutes, dispositive and analogous case law, and departmental
rules and regulations, it is possible to formulate a more thorough version of the requirements of the second, legal prong of
the qualified immunity analysis.

III. CONCLUSION
The qualified immunity doctrine derives from society's
need to balance the competing concerns of effective crimefighting and support for those who daily put their lives on the
line for the community on the one hand, and ordinary citizens
whose civil rights are grossly abused on the other. The SuSee Armacost, supra note 13, at 661-63.
[d. at 662.
17. McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 292-3 (7th Cir. 1992), cited in Armacost,
supra note 13, at 662.
175 McDonald, 966 F.2d at 295, quoted in Armacost, supra note 13, at 662.
17. See also Ignall, supra note 113, at 218.
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preme Court has formulated a standard of qualified immunity
that hinges on two critical elements. To make out an actionable claim and avoid dismissal at summary judgment, an excessive force plaintiff must demonstrate first that the conduct,
as alleged by the plaintiff, amounted to a constitutional violation. Second, after this factual showing, the plaintiff must also
convince a judge that the conduct in question was forbidden by
clearly established law of which any reasonable officer would
be aware.
This doctrine has become especially important amidst a retrenchment in support for urban law enforcement. Unsustainable complaints against police behavior appear to be on the rise
and, whether or not personal financial liability plays an important role in the calculus, the conduct of police officers seems to
be influenced by these trends. All of these developments necessitate some system of terminating unjustified lawsuits at an
early stage.
Yet, this seemingly simple qualified immunity standard
actually contains great complexity. Supreme Court justices
and scholars have questioned whether, in the excessive force
context, the qualified immunity doctrine double-counts reasonableness and offers the defendant "two bites at the apple." Ultimately, the "double-reasonableness" of the doctrine reflects
happenstance and fundamental fairness more than a rational
impossibility. Others have contended that the factual nature of
excessive force cases renders them unfit for adjudication at the
summary judgment stage. In most cases, though, the judge can
simply assume the necessary facts in order to decide both the
factual and legal prongs of the inquiry. Still, rather than abdicating the immunity investigation to the jury, courts might
usefully employ some limited system of judge-led discovery in
order to resolve thorny disputes of fact, to conserve judicial resources, and to deter false allegations. Finally, the definition of
clear establishment is as murky as it is crucial. This article
outlined a vision of what the term encompasses, ranging from
statutes to analogous case law to departmental regulations.
While certain problems continue to bedevil such an explication
of clearly established law, it is possible to improve on the
courts' attempts to foster clarification.
By restricting, as the present qualified immunity doctrine
does, liability in excessive force cases to constitutional violations of clearly established law, our legal system offers abused
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plaintiffs and law enforcement the optimal balance of enabling
effective crime-fighting and stigmatizing truly blameworthy
conduct. 177 By providing for limited discovery and better defining the scope of clear establishment, our system can better
equilibrate that balance and serve the interests of all.

177 In closing, Armacost concludes her own thoughts with the following: "limiting,
rather than expanding, the scope of liability for constitutional violations - by authorizing its use only against clearly and 'genuinely threatening' conduct - may be the best
way to reinforce the special place of constitutional rights in our jurisprudence and ...
in the public consciousness." Armacost, supra note 13, at 680.
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